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JUST BACK FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
This panel was convened at 1:00 p.m., Friday, April 11, by its moderator, Margaret
Satterthwaite of NYU School of Law, who introduced the panelists: Robert Harris of the

Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department;* Makau Mutua of the SUNY
Buffalo School of Law; Yvonne Terlingen of Amnesty International; and Constance de la
Vega of the University of San Francisco School of Law.

Remarks by Makau Mutua*
When I was asked to be on this panel I feared that there was not much to say because I

have mixed emotions about the expectations that were created by the reform of the UN
Commission on Human Rights through its replacement by the Human Rights Council. Quite
apart from semantics in terms of the name change, I think we have to be realistic that nothing

much really has changed. This is fundamentally the nature of inter-governmental organizations

(IGOs) in the context of human rights where states are both the insiders and outsiders. So,
one way to look at the change from the Commission to the Council is to think about five
fellows meeting in Room A and then deciding that they do not like the ambience of the
room and the circulation of the air in the room and therefore move to Room B. You can

draw your conclusions there?whether their meeting in Room B as opposed to A is a
substantial departure from practice.

The Effectiveness of the Council
I think that we have to be careful that we are not looking at a magician's illusion. I say
that because I think we have to be realistic about what to expect from an intergovernmental

body in the area of human rights. The traditional tension between state sovereignty and
international supervision exists and is real. The trade-offs are there. Rarely will you find an
IGO which has coequal parts in terms of strong norms and strong enforcement mechanisms.
Either you get a flaccid institution for enforcement or you get a strong institution but with

weak norms. It is not a conspiracy?I think it is just the way states think. They make sure
that norms float out there in the open, in orbit, without straight paths for implementation.
Norms that threaten states are not desired by states. Institutions that threaten states are not
desired by states, especially in the area of human rights. And so that is why you see institutions

that rhetorically speak to our nobility as a human race but have little capacity to realize that

nobility. That is why I have limited expectations of the Council, and accordingly measure
my ambitions for it in that respect.

We ought to see the Council as a political body whose purpose is to be a gentle civilizer
of nations at the rhetorical level. Because even if we go further and look at, for example,
international tribunals like the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla

via (ICTY), one has to wonder, quite frankly, what is being achieved by these tribunals in
terms of the domestic reconstruction of societies? Has, for example, the ICTR in Tanzania
had any demonstrable effect on reconstruction inside Rwanda? I would say the answer is
no. The two processes are disconnected. So, with respect to the Council, I think we have to
* Mr. Harris did not submit remarks for publication in the Proceedings.
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look at it as a rhetorical forum whose purpose is to inspire nations and countries to aspire
to a higher nobility, understanding that the role of the Council as an enforcer, as a supervisor,

and as an implementer, is sharply limited; that leaves the Council with the most important
function, in my view, and that is the function of setting standards. That is where it is at, and

enforcement of those standards surely must be left at the national level. That is where things

are going to happen. That is where the harvesting of those norms will take place, at the
national level. The consideration of who participates in internalizing those norms at the
national level is a poignant question for civil societies in various countries. So I have this
limited ambition for the Council myself, realizing that primarily it is a political body, whose
purpose is norm setting.

I just want to disagree slightly with the first speaker who said we have all the norms and
standards that we need, and so the challenge now is one of enforcement. I don't think so. I
think if you look, for example, at the human rights corpus, as a body of norms, we have
done very well on questions of political despotism, which is, addressing questions of civil
and political rights, relationships between states and citizens. But we have been bereft and
very poor in thinking about economic despotism, and we act as though free markets are
natural, and that they should be given sanction by the human rights movement. That is a
vast area that is completely left unattended.

The Council and Universality
I think that when we begin talking about a value system that societies across the globe
should subscribe to, we are talking about the necessity of universality. But I think in that
word is hidden many dangers. Universality is not a natural phenomenon. We have to think

about what we are going to make universal, why we are going to make it universal, and
how we are going to make it universal. There is no reason for us to assume that we have
seen a glimpse of eternity and that we know what the good society looks like and that we
know how to get there. I think that if we make those assumptions, we are going to find
ourselves in trouble in several respects. First, if that were the case, we would not really have

the kinds of problems that we have today around the globe.
An earlier speaker said that enormous progress has been made over the last sixty years.

When I look around the globe, I doubt that that is true. I mean, we have Darfur, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the economic crisis around the globe?we have enormous problems. The
globe appears to be melting down. What progress really has been made? So it seems to me
that when we talk about universality, what we ought to be focused on is the question of
legitimacy of those norms that we can agree upon as being universal. And we ought to think
about who is going to agree on the universality of the norms, understanding that universality

is a function of negotiated normativity. We negotiate norms to make them universal. We

should not impose them on people. Nor should states impose those norms on cultures?
instead cultures, traditions, religions, and other important variables must participate in the
negotiation of what is universal and what is not. We should also agree on how and why to

create a hierarchy of norms. And as I pointed out in my earlier comment, we have been
focused almost entirely on the political side and have forgotten the economic side.
We have assumed the naturalness of markets in creating human rights norms. If you look,

for example, at the human rights documents the word capitalism does not appear in those
documents. The word imperialism does not appear in those documents. The word political
democracy does not appear in those documents. The documents run away from the most
important words of the last hundred years, and duck their heads in the sand. In fact, the
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human rights corpus has failed to address economic questions. In order for us to create a
legitimate corpus of human rights that addresses the lives of people, especially in countries
that are developing, as put by Robert Harris to my right, we have to think about people who

live on less than a dollar a day in many parts of the world, in India, in Kenya, in South
Africa, in Latin American and all these places, and craft a normative edifice that responds
to the challenges of economic privation. We have not done so.
As I said before, if you look for example at the way we conceive of political despotism,
of political despots like Adolf Hitler or Idi Amin, they would be unacceptable to the human
rights corpus. But economic despots like Bill Gates or George Soros are not unacceptable.

We seem to think that it is natural for Gates or Soros to be there, to wield that kind of
economic power. If someone held that kind of political power it would be unacceptable. So
I think we should not allow the most powerful countries in the West, including the United
States, to limit our vision about what norms human rights should address.

Is the Council an Improvement over the Commission?
Because human rights victories are few and far between, we take solace in appreciating
the few victories we have. But this discussion brings to my mind the question about what
really is a human rights project. And I think that Robert Harris, my co-panelist, began to
address that issue when he drew this very sharp distinction between western democracies
and those "others," although he tried to run away from his own classification. I won't let
him do so. This reminds me of the historical narrative about the human rights movement as
a gift of the West to the rest of the world. That perception is there. It is an arrogant perception

that the methods of supervision and enforcement, that the norms themselves, are created to

police and civilize brown and black peoples.
Professor Louis Henkin, a figure who is extremely important in our business, has written,
that human rights are America's gift to the rest of the world. That is a predominant narrative

in the human rights movement. The Council itself, and previous to it the Commission, was
meant to play that role of the civilizing crusader. Yet the Commission was not formed to
bring human rights values to the West. That was not the purpose of it. Because when the

Commission was formed, the West colonized the rest of the world, committing serious
atrocities in many parts of the world. Let's not forget, for example, that the United States
was an apartheid state?imagine that! So the West should be careful when pointing fingers
at the rest of the world. That is why developing countries in the Commission felt that they
would use it as a tool for the moral reprimand of the West. That is what they did. To them,
the West had no business pointing fingers at them. They reminded the West of its historical
wrongs. In a sense that was a clearly appropriate role for developing countries to have played.
Now in doing so, did they also shield themselves from scrutiny? Of course they did. But let
he who is clean throw the first stone.

This idea that the commission was politicized is hogwash. The commission was a political
body. How can you politicize that which is political? The West wanted to use the Commission

for its own purposes, to use human rights language as a tool to advance its own foreign
policy objectives. Is there anyone who wants to doubt that is why the United States is always
talking about China's human rights record? Is it because Americans care about the Chinese

human rights record? Of course not. Because if they did, they would care about the human
rights problems in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and in other countries where they have enormous
interests, strategic interests. Not everyone knows this, but Robert Harris knows this, that the
United States spent the last fifty years defending Saudi Arabia before the Human Rights
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Commission. That is a fact. And attacking Cuba, on the other hand. So that duplicity cannot
be allowed to stand. At least not in my court. And as to the fingers being pointed as to who
should be joining the Council and who should not, the contrast was drawn between Libya
and the United States. Now, you know I will be the first one to admit that Muammar Qaddafi

is not papa bear. But I mean Qaddafi and Libya in my books have not committed as many
violations abroad as has the United States. I am sorry to say this, but it is simply a fact.
Look at the record of the United States in Latin America. Look at the record of the United

States during the Cold War. Look at what the United States has done to Iraq. The United
States is not a saint. Not at all. It now occupies a country under false pretenses. So it has
no standing to make a statement about a superior moral claim. So when reform of the Council

is talked about from the point of view of the global North, the Council ought to be a forum
for it to advance its own interests. And if the Council does not do that, it is not good. From
the point of view of the global South, I think the motives are mixed. I think on the one hand

the South wants voice in international institutions, and secondly, it wants inclusivity. That
is what reform means to the South. Now there are also many, many bad countries in the
South?countries that want to shield themselves from international scrutiny. But the answer
to the problem of badness by states is not this dual narrative that has been created, which
is duplicitous and hypocritical.
So I just want to make sure that we understand that if we are serious about going beyond
standard setting, beyond mobilizing shame, beyond sanctioning by word of mouth, we have
to re-conceive the Council. I think it might be perhaps useful to carry out real reform in the

Council as opposed to musical chairs. And real reform might mean, for example, making
the Council a forum for experts as opposed to states. Make it a forum for experts. Give it
to experts who care about human rights and who can set the right agenda. Then create a
normative relationship between the Council of experts and the states in which at least we
know the Council would put the real issues on the table without fear or favor. That has not
happened. It is no wonder that 170 countries approved the resolution creating the Council.
Why? Because they saw it as flaccid. So all of us in human rights have to decide either to
play along with the states as they pretend to do something or we can tell them "look you
guys ain't doing much."

Conclusion
One thing we do as academics is try to understand questions of history in their entirety,
and to frame issues in thematic ways. And so when I look at human rights I am not looking
at a convention or a norm or an article in the convention. I am looking at the human rights
text, by which I mean the entire corpus, as a statement of history, a certain history. And
then I am trying to place that statement of history in the context of a larger historical narrative.

So when I look at human rights, I say what are human rights? They are a genre of international

law. What is international law, I ask myself. Why was it necessary to create international
law? Could we live without it? Who created international law? I ask those kinds of questions.

These are fascinating questions.
I want to refer you to the work of Antony Anghie, Professor of Law at the University of

Utah College of Law. I think he has done the most definitive work on the colonial origins
of international law. He has shown that the nature of the legal argument of international law
as a system of rules and structures has as its original intent the management of brown and

black peoples, whom it regards as dangerous and largely unmanageable. Let's just do the
history. If you look at the early part of the human rights movement, one is left with little
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choice but to conclude that if you look at the discussions within the Commission in the
formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other subsequent documents,
if you look at the countries that lined up on various issues, and you look at earlier historical
developments in colonialism, it is difficult for us not to deny that human rights is a part of
an historical continuum, stretching from the merchant of capital and the colonial administrator

in which colonialism was perceived as a reclamation of backward cultures. That was the
moral justification of colonialism. Of course its real rationale was economic exploitation.
But its moral justification was that those backward peoples in the global South had to be
organized into states, out of which sense could be made out of them.
The international state system is a system of policing. Nor can we get away from the fact

that the United States is a global policeman. That is just a fact. And so what you want to
look at is the nature of the norms in the human rights movement and ask yourselves what
role do those norms play, who are they policing? What are they trying to create? I think if

you look at the ICC, the ICTR, and ICTY, you want to ask yourself, which Western leader
is going to be the subject of the ICC? Or the ICTY? Can you imagine the ICC trying Donald
Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney? It is no accident that the people that the ICC is trying to indict

are the Sudanese, who no doubt deserve to be indicted, and Joseph Kony, the Ugandan
genocidal killer. But are these Third Worlders the only horrible violators of human rights
today? I leave you with that question.

Remarks by Yvonne Terlingen*
Since the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was adopted sixty years ago, enormous
progress has been made in the codification of international human rights law and in creating

a global human rights machinery. World leaders recognized in 2005 that human rights are
now one of the three pillars of the United Nations and decided to create a new human rights
body for the UN: the Human Rights Council. Yet human rights violations persist everywhere.

Great challenges remain in generating the political will necessary to implement the seven
core human rights treaties and in making human rights a reality for numerous people denied

access to effective human rights protection in all regions of the world. No country's human
rights record is perfect.
The United Nations role in furthering human rights protection is four-fold: monitoring and
reporting on all situations; triggering an effective reaction where necessary; promoting justice

and accountability as well as facilitating rebuilding and providing redress. As Louise Arbour,

the outgoing High Commissioner for Human Rights, remarked: "the core challenge to the
Security Council and the United Nations as a whole in the next century: to forge unity behind

the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights?wherever they may

take place?should not be allowed to stand."
Meeting that challenge has not been made easier in a climate of erosion of respect for
human rights triggered by the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. Traditional standard

bearers, such as the United States?with its strong human rights tradition?and Western
Europe, are no longer perceived as champions of human rights: the former is held responsible

for flouting the most basic human rights standards witnessed in Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib and both together for complicity in the abduction, secret detention and transfer of

prisoners in the "war on terror."

* Head of Amnesty International Office at the United Nations.

